Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis.
Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity
In 1985, Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan Leslie, and Uta Frith published an influential paper entitled 'Does the autistic child have a theory of mind (ToM)?' They presented evidence that children with autism were impaired relative to typically developing and Downs syndrome children on nonverbal 'false-belief' tests of ToM, the ability to form beliefs about the mental states of others. Recently, some researchers in cognitive neuroscience have argued, on the basis of neuroimaging results, that the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) contains a domain-specific cognitive system specialized for ToM. This suggests an elegant theoretical and empirical marriage between developmental psychology and neuroscience. The basis of this marriage is the idea that cognitive neuroscientists and developmental psychologists are studying the same domain-specific 'module' at different levels; with neuroscience revealing the neural substrate of a discrete cognitive capacity. 1 We argue, however, that both fields are studying the emergent outcome of interaction between numerous domain-specific low-level cognitive systems and domain-general cognitive systems. The low-level domain-specific systems such as joint attention, gaze tracking, animacy detection, and recognition of emotional expression develop early (Baron-Cohen [1995] ; Rutherford et al. [2006] ; Stone [2005] ). The domain-general systems such as metarepresentation (MR), secondary representation (SR), executive function (EF), recursive embedding, and natural language develop later (Perner [1991] ; Suddendorf [1999] ; Suddendorf and Whiten [2001] ; De Villiers and Pyers [2002] ; Smith et al. [2003] ). It is their interaction in development, rather than the maturation of a mindreading module, which explains the emergence of ToM. Thus the notion of 'modularity' of ToM is misleading if taken to mean a discrete cognitive entity implemented in specialized neural circuitry.
The argument against the presence of a ToM module (or a ToM domainspecific cognitive mechanism) provides a general lesson for the explanation of cognition and a cautionary tale for evolutionary psychology: modulae non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. We develop the argument in five stages:
1. Passing the false-belief test does not necessarily depend on a domain-specific cognitive mechanism. We suggest an alternative cognitive architecture that can explain the phenomena that led to the postulation of the ToM module.
2. Recent evidence from neuroscience does not support the inference to the presence of a ToM module.
1
If so, we would have identified a cognitive device evolved to solve an adaptive problem (Sterelny and Griffiths [1999] ). Evolutionary psychologists suggest we identity such devices in order to assist in determining which features of the cognitive phenotype are adaptations (Tooby & Cosmides [1992] ). Atkinson and Wheeler ([2004] ), however, point out that the relationship of explanatory priority between cognitive device and adaptive function is theoretically problematic. Although many of Atkinson and Wheeler's arguments are situated within the framework of evolutionary psychology, rather than developmental psychology and neuroscience, we are sympathetic to a general line of argument used by critics of naïve adaptationism. The inference from apparent cognitive structure in the phenotype (in our case a dissociation in performance on false-belief and false-photo tasks) to the presence of domain-specific cognitive mechanisms is not straightforward. Just as Samuels ([1998] ) proposes an alternative general processing architecture (the library conception) to argue against the inference from apparent domain specificity to modularity, we provide a specific alternative architecture to show that the selective activation in the TPJ in ToM tasks is not evidence for the presence of a domain-specific cognitive mechanism.
3. Our suggested architecture is more parsimonious.
4. We support our case in part by comparison to the case of language, which many theorists argue is a high-level module, which takes outputs from domain-specific cognitive subsystems as inputs. The interest of the case of language is that if those arguments are sound then we have a case of a module constructed in development by the type of interaction we think explains ToM. We argue, however, that the arguments in support of modularity of language do not apply to the case of ToM. This is particularly important because the case of language acquisition has served as a general model for the postulation of domain-specific cognitive architecture (Pinker [1989] ; Cosmides and Tooby [1995] ; Cosmides and Tooby [1994] ; Gelman and Hirschfeld [1994] Before developing our argument we need to discuss a central distinction between domain-specific and domain-general cognitive abilities. Domaingeneral abilities include working memory, EF, recursion, attention, and MR. These capacities process information without being restricted to a particular representational format. While the visual system, for example, can process only optical information, attention can be focused on visual, auditory, sensory, spatial, or higher-order representations produced by any more-specialized system. The same is true of EF (inhibition, sequencing, flexible control of attention): any of these processes must operate over a wide variety of representational formats. Domain-specific subsystems, such as the visual system, process only their proprietary inputs using representations specialized for their task and produce outputs in specialized representational formats. It is this specialization that provides the contrast between domain-general and domain-specific cognitive systems. Indeed, the lack of specialization of domain-general systems is required in order for them to be able to process the variety of representations produced by the mind's domain-specific systems. The existence of domain specificity necessitates domain generality for any creature that needs to integrate different types of information. The terms domain-specific and modular are sometimes used interchangeably; however, the notion of a 'module' is a contested one. For example, it has been variously characterized as a restricted database, a specialized neural mechanism, distributed or localized, an informationally encapsulated cognitive process, a cognitive process vulnerable to selective deficit, a functionally discrete component of a computational system, or a content-specific cognitive capacity. 2 The advent of fMRI has led most researchers in the field to adopt one of these conceptions of modularity to explain the selective activation of different neural circuits observed under different task conditions: that is, to treat neural activation as implementation of one of these definitions. It is worth noting that all these characterizations of 'module' attempt to preserve the basic distinction between specialization and generality while doing justice to the complexity of cognition at different levels of analysis. We do not wish to adjudicate debates between proponents of different conceptions because the decision to adopt a definition depends very much on which aspects of cognition one wants to emphasize. 3 For example, encapsulation theorists need to deal with the large amount of top-down processing, recurrence, and cross-talk in the brain, which means that few systems are entirely informationally discrete. Localization theorists must address the distributed nature of cognition, and so on. Each view seems to encounter some difficulties and counter examples. Nonetheless, despite the problem of providing a watertight definition, brain research continues (i) to demonstrate a very high degree of functional specialization down to the molecular level; (ii) to show that some cognitive functions, such as attention or working memory, are not restricted in the representations they can take as inputs.
Consequently, we will use the terms domain-specific cognitive mechanism and domain-general cognitive mechanism to capture this distinction in our 2 (Coltheart [1999] ) contains a helpful survey of costs and benefits associated with adopting different conceptions. As he points out, following Shallice ([1988] ) neuropsychologists use acquired lesion to determine functional architecture without being committed to a stronger notion of anatomical modularity. He also points out that Fodor's influential discussion did not propose necessary and sufficient conditions for modularity but a cluster of related features modules might possess in degrees. Like Pylyshyn ([1999] ), however, Fodor does think that modules are informationally encapsulated from central processes of inference. Samuels ([1998] ) helpfully makes a distinction between the algorithmic conception and the hardware conception of modularity. A laptop is a domain-general piece of hardware, which runs many domainspecific programs (e.g. a word processor and an internet browser). If hardware is domain-specific then the algorithms running on that hardware must also be domain-specific. This is the intuitive idea behind the idea that a neurally specialized system (such as vision) is encapsulated from domain-specific processes advanced in the work of Fodor ([1983] ). But it does not follow from the fact that algorithms are domain-specific (e.g. a graphics program), that hardware is domain-specific. So the inference from the presence of domain specificity in the cognitive phenotype to domain specificity in the neural phenotype is invalid. Atkinson and Wheeler ([2004] ) point out that the possibility of different foci of explanation generates a problem of indeterminacy for the boundaries of modules. Like Samuels, their target is the use of adaptationist methodology to determine the boundary or domain of a module. Which of an organism's features (cognitive or physical) is an adaptation requires us to solve a simultaneous equation with variables being the adaptive problem and the feature (Sterenly and Griffiths [2003] ). Since both features and adaptive problems decompose into microconstituents the problem of indeterminacy rapidly ramifies. As they point out, this does not invalidate the program of linking neural and cognitive specialization, but it requires the theorist to move 'within and between levels of organization and levels of analysis' (p. 170). Our tour of this territory did not reveal any evidence of either hardware or algorithm specialized for ToM. discussion. This is adequate for our purpose, which is to recapture the insight of the original proposal by Baron-Cohen et al. ([1985] ) that ToM is the application of a domain-general capacity to a specific task.
In their 1985 paper, Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith proposed a cognitive account of ToM which treats it as 'one of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity' ([1985] , p. 37, emphasis added). MR is the ability to represent the relationship between a representation and its object. As the quote implies it is not necessarily limited to MR of mental states (Perner [1991] ; Suddendorf [1999] ; Suddendorf and Whiten [2001] ; Corballis [2003] ; Povinelli [1996] ) and is thus a domain-general ability. Subsequently, other developmental theorists pursued the idea that ToM depends on a domainspecific capacity for MR of mental states: the ToM mechanism (e.g. Leslie [1987] , [1994] ). Theorists differ over the nature of domain specificity in ToM. All agree ToM is content specific (its domain is the MR of mental states) but the nature of its representational format, relationship with other domain-specific capacities, and neural implementation are controversial.
Evidence for domain specificity in ToM is provided by an apparent dissociation between domain-general MR and MR of mental states. In particular, many children with autism who fail the false-belief test pass the false-photograph test, which requires MR of representational relationships with nonmental state content, while normal children exhibit a converse pattern of performance (Zaitchik [1990] ).
For domain-specific theorists, ToM is a domain-specific capacity, and autism results from impairment to the development of a ToM mechanism: a neurocomputational system specialized for the MR of mental states. The fact that autism is a developmental rather than an acquired disorder also suggests to some theorists that the domain-specific mechanism is innate, in the same way that disorders such as specific language impairment support nativist inferences about the nature of human language ability. Although the coherence of nativism and the inference from developmental deficit to innateness have been contested (Elman et al. [1996] ; Karmiloff- Smith [1998] ; Karmiloff-Smith et al. [2003] ), those supporting the domain-specific conception of ToM regard it as a domain-specific cognitive adaptation that depends on the genetically guided maturation of specialized neural circuitry. It is for this reason that the near-universal presence of ToM in the human phenotype has been recruited by Evolutionary Psychology as evidence for domain-specific nativism (Cosmides & Tooby [1995] ).
More recently, cognitive neuroscience, using data from fMRI and lesion studies, has investigated ToM by locating neural circuitry which subserves it and attempting to distinguish ToM from other capacities, such as working memory or more general inferential abilities (Stone et al. [1998] ; Saxe & Kanwisher [2003] ; Apperly et al. [2004] ; Samson et al. [2004] ; Saxe et al. [2004] ).
Initial studies focused on the frontal lobes, either medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (Fletcher et al. [1995] ; Gallagher and Frith [2003] ) or orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Stone et al. [1998] ; Gregory et al. [2002] ). More recent studies have implicated the TPJ in ToM performance. The TPJ is of particular interest because fMRI studies showed it to be active during false-belief tasks but not false-photograph tasks, suggesting a neural substrate for the behavioral dissociation that prompted the initial postulation of a ToM module (Saxe and Kanwisher [2003] ; Saxe [2004] ).
These convergent lines of inquiry from developmental psychology and neuroscience have persuaded many theorists that ToM is a domain-specific cognitive ability. However, we argue that an alternative model of ToM development can account more parsimoniously for the data from autism and neuroscience.
Our main concern is to defuse the arguments for domain specificity in ToM rather than nativism, since the two are logically independent. However, the inference to nativism from empirical evidence about ToM is less persuasive once the relationships between developmental components of ToM are clarified.
Developmental Components of ToM
Before we consider the evidence from neuroscience let us recall what is in common between all theorists of ToM development. First, development of ToM depends on the prior development of a suite of specialized lowerlevel cognitive mechanisms. These precursor mechanisms represent vital information about the social world of the infant and toddler, and mediate her earliest interactions with others. These mechanisms enable face processing, representations of gaze direction, gaze monitoring, detection of animacy, tracking of intentions and goals, and joint attention (Baron-Cohen [1995] ; Dawson et al. [1998] Rutherford et al. [2006] ). These capacities seem to be specific to social stimuli, are shared with other primates, and appear to depend on neural circuitry that responds specifically to social stimuli (e.g. Campbell et al. [1990] ; Kumashiro et al. [2002] ; Blakemore et al. [2003] ; Csibra et al. [2003] ; Povinelli et al. [2003] ). Gaze monitoring, for example, seems to involve specific regions of the superior temporal sulcus that respond to the stimulus of eye gaze direction but not to other stimuli, even other stimuli that are physically similar to images of eyes (Campbell et al. [1990] ; Perrett et al. [1990] ; Hoffman and Haxby [2000] ). Assessing others' goals and intentions seems to depend on specific representations of certain movement patterns, limb movement, combined with gaze, head or body orientation, and involves both superior temporal sulcus and superior parietal and lateral frontal areas (Jellema et al. [2000] ; Blakemore et al. [2003] ).
The development of these domain-specific mechanisms ensures that the normal toddler is equipped with a sophisticated battery of mechanisms, which enable her to negotiate the social world on the basis of perceptually available information. In this respect, she is like the great apes and uses essentially the same cognitive equipment. Like the great apes she cannot compute over abstract representations of unobservable states to predict and explain conspecific behavior. She cannot metarepresent beliefs (Suddendorf [1999] ; Suddendorf and Whiten [2001] ).
Thus, one way to describe the issue between domain-specific and domaingeneral accounts of ToM abilities is as a debate about the nature of an important cognitive difference between the great apes and ourselves. We argue that homo sapiens' superior ToM capacity does not depend on the evolution in the hominid line of a domain-specific ToM mechanism. Our domain-general capacities in combination with domain-specific precursors, such as gaze processing and emotion recognition, explain ToM performance.
The presence and nature of these domain-general capacities is another point of agreement between all theorists. The normal 4-year-old is equipped with a battery of cognitive devices which subserve domain-general metacognitive computational functions. Advanced EF (meaning working memory, inhibition, and flexible control of attention), SRs (the capacity to hold in mind and compare two different representations), recursion (the ability to compute embedded representations), and MR (understanding the representational nature of the relationship between representation and referent) have all come online by ages 2-4, though they may continue to develop further after age 4 (Perner [1991] ; Suddendorf [1999] ; Suddendorf and Whiten [2001] ; De Villiers and Pyers [2002] ; Smith et al. [2003] ). It is advanced EF, MR and recursion-all domain-general cognitive abilities-that distance us from our primate ancestors (Suddendorf [1999] ; Suddendorf and Whiten [2001] ), rather than the fact that we possess a domain-specific ToM mechanism and they do not.
However, our claim is not that presence of ToM in normal children, or its absence in autism, is entirely accounted for by these metarepresentational abilities. Toddlers, chimps, and children with Downs syndrome, who lack metarepresentational abilities in different ways and to different degrees, do not resemble individuals with autism. Further evidence is the fact that although solving false-belief tasks clearly places demands on EF, there are no clear early deficits in EF in autism (Griffith et al. [1999] ). Furthermore, apparent deficits in EF disappear when children with autism are tested by a computer rather than a person (Ozonoff et al. [1991] ; Ozonoff [1995] ).
In our view, these results are to be expected since ToM abilities depend, not on MR, EF, language, or recursion per se, but on their developmental interaction with the low-level precursors previously described, e.g. gaze processing, emotion recognition, and joint attention (see Figures 1 and 2 for a graphic representation of this architecture in comparison to that postulated by modular explanations of ToM). The result of this interaction is not the creation of an extra module but the wiring up of distributed metarepresentational circuitry which can take social information as input (Gerrans [2003] ; Stone [2005] ) and, ultimately, compute over abstract representations of mental states not tied to a perceptual modality. The manipulation of those abstract representations is not, however, essentially different from the manipulation of other abstract representations involving recursion, natural language, and MR. Nor does it need to involve a distinct neurocomputational mechanism.
MR operating on information about eye gaze and attention (who saw or was attending to what) allows us to represent others' knowledge states (who knew what) (Baron-Cohen [1995] ). Recursion operating on MRs of mental states allows us to reason about not just others' thoughts, but others' thoughts about thoughts (Corballis [2003] ). Indeed, children's abilities to use embedded syntactical structures comes online shortly before the ability to solve falsebelief tasks, supporting the view that recursion may be a general ability serving both tasks (Apperly et al. [2004] , [2005] ). EF allows us to keep the elements of a social interaction in mind, and inhibit our own knowledge of the state of reality when asked what someone else's mental state is (Stone [2005] ). Both working memory and inhibition have been shown to be related to performance on ToM tasks (Keenan [1998] ; Stone et al. [1998] ; Carlson and Moses [2001] ). We note in this regard, that Sabbagh et al. ([2006] ) found that 3-5-year-old performance on an executive task requiring inhibition predicted performance on false-belief and false-sign tasks but not false-photo tasks. In summary, deficits on ToM tasks could potentially result from deficits in either low-level input systems (e.g. joint attention) or higher-level domain-general capacities, rather than in a separate ToM mechanism.
The Analogy with Modularity of Language
Our view seems to face two related problems. The first is that a modular theorist could point out that maturation of any cognitively sophisticated module would require developmental interaction between domain-general cognition and domain-specific precursors. In the case of language, for example, domain-specific mechanisms such as phonological processing interact with domain-general ones such as EF, SR, and MR and the consequence of this interaction is the construction of a language module (Smith [1999] ; Saxe et al. [2004] ), which is vulnerable to both developmental and acquired double dissociations. In fact, the case of language is instructive because when we compare language and ToM we find that the main arguments for domain specificity between the two cases are not analogous. Our discussion is brief because we are conceding the controversial points that language is modular and that Specific Language Impairment is a developmental dissociation of that module. We merely point out that arguments for those conclusions are much less persuasive in the case of ToM.
First, Poverty of Stimulus arguments for modularity of language rely on the fact that the evidence available to children in their linguistic environment (primary linguistic data) underdetermines possible grammars. In order to explain the near-universal convergence of developmental trajectories across the human cognitive phenotype we need to postulate specialized cognitive architecture (Chomsky [1986] ). The inference to ToM from the child's experience, however, is not similarly unconstrained. The child's domainspecific precursors to ToM are a rich body of evidence for the hypothesis that other people act on the basis of intentional states. The child does not need a special neurocomputational device to generate and test that hypothesis, she merely needs to apply her domain-general capacities for hypothesis formation to the 'primary psychological data' in which she is immersed.
Second, the theoretical argument for language modularity is empirically reinforced by the presence of acquired dissociations, such as aphasia, in which syntactic processing is impaired while both domain-specific precursors to language and domain-general mechanisms remain intact. However, there are no equivalent cases of acquired deficits to ToM that spare other cognitive abilities (see Section 5 for a full discussion of recent neuroscientific work on this issue). If ToM is a genuine domain-specific mechanism, this lack of empirical evidence is surprising.
Third, the modular theorist of language can point to cases of developmental double dissociation of the capacity for syntactic processing. Smith and Ianthi-Simpli ([1995] ) report the case of a quite severely cognitively impaired man who, nonetheless, has an amazing facility with the syntactic aspects of over twenty languages. This man's facility with syntax could be explained by the sparing of his language module. His case, however, is only a single dissociation, of spared syntactical abilities from impaired domain-general cognition. Double dissociations are more convincing arguments for modularity, and the reverse dissociation is in fact known. There are cases of selective impairment to syntactic processing with sparing of other cognitive capacities: the disorder known as Grammatical Specific Language Impairment is interpreted in that way. (Gopnik and Goad [1997] ; Van der Lely and Stollwerk [1997] ).
Whether autism is evidence for the presence of a selective developmental single dissociation in a ToM module is still at issue, as discussed below. However, there is no evidence for a double dissociation, the selective sparing in development of ToM. Researchers were initially misled by the hypersociability and expressiveness of children with Williams syndrome into thinking that they had a spared ToM (Karmiloff- Smith et al. [1995] ) However, subsequent studies have shown that their ToM also develops abnormally, as do their language abilities (Tager-Flusberg [2000] ; Gerrans [2002] ). In our view, this connection results from the fact that language and ToM both depend on some of the same domain-general capacities, MR and recursion, which may be impaired in Williams syndrome.
Thus, the theoretical and empirical considerations which support modularity theses about language do not apply straightforwardly to ToM. The empirical evidence in it is simply not there, as discussed further below, and the theoretical arguments (poverty of the stimulus) are difficult to uphold in light of the social information children are exposed to.
Dissociations without Modules
However, even if proponents of domain specificity in ToM accepted these points, they would press a second difficulty for our account. We still need to explain dissociations between performance on false-belief and falsephotograph tasks. This difficulty seems especially pressing given that attempts to explain ToM deficits in terms of deficits in EF or MR have not been entirely successful. Attempts to explain autism in terms of EF have foundered on a lack of early EF deficits in autism, and attempts to explain it as a general metarepresentational deficit have foundered on autistic children's excellent performance on false-photograph tasks.
Our reply to domain-specific theorists of ToM is that if children with autism have intact MR, but impaired inputs to MR from impaired lowlevel domain-specific mechanisms (e.g. joint attention), then one would predict exactly this dissociation between false-photograph and false-belief performance. Individuals with autism perform well on the false-photograph task because the inputs to the metarepresentational system, in that task, are not impaired in autism. See Figure 3 for a graphic representation.
We believe that deficits on ToM tasks in autism arise essentially from deficits in lower-level input systems. Research on social deficits in autism has shown clearly that children with autism have deficits in many early domain-specific social competences: face recognition, facial expression recognition, processing of gaze direction, and joint attention; (Osterling and Dawson [1994] ; Boucher Klin et al. [1999] ; Baird et al. [2000] ; Grice et al. [2005] ; Schultz [2005] ). The performance of children with autism on ToM tests can be explained more parsimoniously by the view that they have deficits, not in MR, but in lower-level domain-specific mechanisms for processing social information. Without proper inputs, the intact capacity for MR by itself cannot make correct ToM inferences with the same fluency and automaticity as the mind of the normal 4-year-old. Thus, we argue that autistic deficits on ToM tasks are evidence, not for impaired MR, but are instead evidence of impaired inputs to metarepresentational systems recruited by ToM tasks. Strong evidence against this view would be a case of an individual with specific deficits on metarepresentational ToM tasks, such as false belief, but no lower-level social deficits, but as we noted, no such case has been reported.
In our view, then, there should be cases of high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD) individuals in whom MR is intact. Evidence supports this view. In the absence of comorbid intellectual disability, individuals with autism seem to have intact capacities for MR, recursion and EF. Children with autism perform well on a nonmental metarepresentational task, the false-photograph test (Leslie and Thaiss [1992] ). Baron-Cohen et al. ([1999] ) report three cases of high-functioning individuals with ASD, a mathematician, a physicist, and an engineering student. All three fields require people to represent the relations between symbols and their objects (magnitudes, abstract spatial relations) and to perform recursive computations over these symbols. These three men excelled in their fields (in fact, the mathematician was a Fields medalist), showing that their capacity for MR and recursion was intact. Furthermore, all did well on the Tower of Hanoi, an EF test that requires not only EF, but also recursion. However, all three had difficulty in inferring what someone was feeling, or paying attention to, from pictures of the eye region of the face (Baron-Cohen et al. [1999] ), indicating a problem with lower-level domain-specific capacities for face and gaze processing rather than MR.
The weight of evidence indicates that the ToM impairments in autism and related disorders are a result of abnormal developmental interaction between low-level input systems and higher-level domain-general capacities, caused essentially by deficits in ToM precursors. An individual with a deficit in ToM MR, without any deficit in lower-level social competences and without any more general deficit in other relevant domain-general competences would provide conclusive evidence against our view. No such case has yet been invoked in support of the domain-specific ToM hypothesis. Yet, as we remarked earlier, such cases of selective deficits are the core evidence for modularity hypotheses in other areas, such as language. We note in passing that our view of the evidence is more parsimonious. The domain-specific ToM theorist requires that MR emerges twice, once for mental states and once for domain-general computation, in both evolution and development.
The Evidence from Neuroscience
If children with autism do not provide developmental evidence for domain specificity in ToM, then perhaps data from neurological patients with lesions would provide stronger evidence. These might provide evidence for selective acquired deficits to an existing domain-specific mechanism. In contrast, on our view, if deficits on ToM tasks result from deficits in higher-level domaingeneral capacities, rather than in a separate domain-specific mechanism, we would expect ToM deficits to be accompanied by deficits in other tasks requiring domain-general metacognition. Our prediction is vindicated by existing evidence from neuropsychology. Current research seems only to support the view that it is not possible to be impaired on ToM tasks without a concurrent deficit in either lower-level social abilities or deficits in other domain-general abilities.
Patients with OFC damage, for example, have been found to be impaired on ToM tasks (Stone et al. [1998] ; Gregory et al. [2002] ). However, they are also impaired at recognizing facial expressions, judging mental states from eye gaze or expression in the eye region of the face (Hornak et al. [1996] ; Gregory et al. [2002] ; Snowden et al. [2003] ). Furthermore, even their problems with some ToM tasks may result from a difficulty in tracking intentions rather than beliefs (Stone [2000] , [2005] ). Thus, their mentalizing deficits can be explained as a result of deficits in lower-level domain-specific mechanisms, not in higherorder domain-general mechanisms. Indeed, they can perform at ceiling-levels on false-belief tasks, even those requiring 2nd-and 3rd-order mental state inferences (Stone et al. [1998] ; Stone [2005] ).
Early neuroimaging studies of ToM implicated the MPFC as an area needed for the MR of mental states. If MPFC is necessary for ToM, then patients with damage in that area should show specific deficits. However, patients with medial frontal damage who have ToM deficits all have accompanying EF deficits (Happé et al. [2001] ; Gregory et al. [2002] ; Stone [2005] ). Furthermore, extensive medial frontal damage does not necessarily cause impairment in ToM (Bird et al. [2004] ). Hence, while MPFC is recruited during ToM tasks its contribution does not seem to be specific to ToM inferences.
Perhaps, then, more recent fMRI studies implicating the TPJ in the attribution of mental states might provide the basis for the ToM module? Saxe and Kanwisher ([2003] ) found that the TPJ is more active in false-belief tasks than in tasks requiring the attribution of intention or social information. They also found that the TPJ was less strongly activated in false-photo tasks than in false-belief tasks, which they say suggests a crucial role for the TPJ in ToM inferences (Saxe and Kanwisher [2003] ). However, in discussing their results, they also noted that while the false-photo tasks were 'logically similar' to the ToM tasks they were also 'more difficult ' (p. 1840) . This raises the possibility that the differential activation in TPJ is a resource artefact within MR. That is to say, perhaps the difference in difficulty of the tasks accounts for the difference in activation.
A possible explanation for the difference in difficulty is that the TPJ, although a domain-general metarepresentational system, is constantly receiving social information from the early domain-specific social input systems we identified. Thus, the baseline level of activation for metarepresenting social information is already high. Any new, nonsocial, task needs either to bring TPJ activation up to the same baseline or to inhibit the social input systems to allow the nonsocial information to command TPJ processing resources. This could explain differences in activation levels in TPJ produced by false-belief and false-photograph tasks, and explain why Saxe and Kanwisher's participants took longer to do false-photograph than false-belief tasks.
Thus, more decisive evidence for TPJ specialization for ToM would be provided by false-belief and false-photo studies, which posed identical executive and cognitive resource demands. By using better-matched tasks in a neuroimaging paradigm, this issue could be resolved. The issue could also be approached by further analyses of current imaging data. Saxe and Kanwisher ([2003] ) present contrasts between false-belief and false-photograph trials, and between false-belief task and nonmetarepresentational-task trials. They do not, however, present any whole-brain contrasts for all participants between falsephotograph task and nonmetarepresentational-task trials. If such a contrast did show differential activation in TPJ, then this would support the view that TPJ might underwrite MR more generally. In that case, the differential activation in TPJ between false-belief and false-photograph trials might simply reflect how much each task demands of a metarepresentational capacity, though both require MR. In contrast, if TPJ was not differentially active when nonmetarepresentational tasks are subtracted from false-photograph tasks, there would be stronger evidence for TPJ's specialization for belief state MR.
In the absence of imaging studies of false-belief and false-photograph tasks that control for executive demands, we can turn to recent work with TPJ lesion patients (Apperly et al. [2004] ; Samson et al. [2004] ). The hypothesis that TPJ is the site of the ToM mechanism suggests that TPJ patients should have specific ToM deficits. Indeed, initial research with TPJ patients showed deficits on false-belief tasks and not other EF tasks even when the general demands of EF were controlled for (Apperly et al. [2004] ; Samson et al. [2004] ). However, the most recent research shows that all TPJ lesion patients who performed below chance on false-belief tasks also performed poorly on a false-photograph test (Apperly et al., [2007] ). Thus, there is as yet no conclusive evidence from neurological patients that supports the claim that the TPJ is the site of a domain-specific mechanism dedicated to ToM inferences.
In fact, Apperly et al.' s data suggests that, although TPJ does not appear to be specialized for ToM, it may be specialized for MR and recruited by metarepresentational aspects of ToM tasks.
Conclusion
As we noted earlier, MR is one of the abilities that emerged over the course of hominid evolution that separates humans from the great apes, (Suddendorf [1999] ; Corballis [2003] ). In our view, it is not surprising that our ToM abilities emerge in concert with the suite of other abilities which distance us from the apes, all of which are essentially dependent on the architecture of the prefrontal cortex and temporal lobes. The fact that domain-general cognition, which allows us to detach from perceptual stimuli and represents unobservable facts, is largely occupied in the first few years with social interaction is a natural consequence of our altricial developmental trajectory.
In the absence of strong evidence for dedicated neural circuitry or the dissociation of ToM from metarepresentational or lower-level deficits, it seems that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domainspecific mechanisms can account for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module.
One can understand, as an episode in the history of science, why it seemed necessary to posit a specific ToM module. Early evidence from autism seemed to show a pattern of impairment in MR of belief, without a corresponding impairment in MR in other domains (Baron-Cohen et al. [1985] , Leslie and Thaiss [1992] ). Only later did it become clear that the deficits in autism were at a lower level. Furthermore, early explorations of the role of MR understood as a general prerequisite for higher cognition (Perner [1991] ; Suddendorf [1999] ; Corballis [2003] ) were overlooked once an apparent dissociation between ToM and domain-general MR was demonstrated (Leslie and Thaiss [1992] ).
However, postulating a domain-specific ToM mechanism to explain autistic deficits appears to have been an unnecessary elaboration on an already adequate basic theoretical structure: i.e one containing domain-specific input systems like shared attention and domain-general systems such as EF, MR, SR, and language, for higher-order cognition. We believe that this episode in the history of cognitive science can serve as a cautionary tale to evolutionary psychologists and modular theorists: it is important, in proposing a certain cognitive architecture, to make sure that one has not postulated more modules than are warranted by the data: modulae non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. The data for language justifies the postulation of a separate module-not so for ToM. Just as the heliocentric theory of celestial motion removed the need for epicycles in explanations of planetary orbits, a proper understanding of the role of MR allows us to see past the limitations of modulocentric theorising about ToM.
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